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I. Introduction
During the last twenty years, a burgeoning literature has accompanied the rise of Fair to "contribute to sustainable development by offering better trading conditions to, and secure the rights of, marginalized producers and workers -especially in the South" (FINE 2001) .
Producers have to meet a variety of criteria that focus on a range of areas, including labor standards, sustainable farming, governance, and democratic participation (FLO 2010) . Certified groups are guaranteed a minimum price for their produce, which is defined according to product and region. If the market price is above the minimum price, Fair Trade contracts must pay at least as much as the market price. Groups are paid a social premium amount in addition to the market price, which is mandated for community social, health, and infrastructure investments.
Contracts are guaranteed for many seasons to reduce fluctuations in market access and price. For most products, only co-operatives of farmers can be Fair Trade certified. In cases of plantation 2 crops, such as cotton or tea, the plantation itself can be certified, with corresponding rules for the treatment of labor.
Over the past decade, the number of FLO-registered producer organizations has grown rapidly, from 508 in 2005 to 991 at the end of 2011. The majority of Fair Trade-certified organizations are located in Latin America and the Caribbean; indeed, 9.18 and 8.27 percent of all certified organizations are located in Peru and Colombia, respectively. Coffee growers' organizations are the largest product group, accounting for about 35% of all registered producer organizations, but other products are expanding as well, including sugar and tea (FLO 2012) . found that these case studies provide more modest evidence that Fair Trade has positive impacts on social, environmental, and economic outcomes. Similarly, the review by Dragusanu, Giovannucci, and Nunn (2013) shows that Fair Trade and organic certification is correlated with more environmentally friendly farming practices and the perception that the economic environment is more stable. More research is needed in order to unveil the causal impacts of Fair Trade certification.
We contribute to the existing literature by reviewing the theoretical work to date on Fair
Trade, and through our study of both empirical papers that statistically control for differences among Fair Trade and non-Fair Trade producers and those that do not control for those differences. Our survey of empirical papers will focus on Fair Trade coffee given the large share of certified producer organizations that make this product and since most empirical evidence focuses on coffee. supply, many producers will be selling to a smaller market, and mainstream producers could be made worse off depending on the price elasticity of demand (Leclair 2002) . If supply is large relative to demand, prices will tend to decrease.
If demand is elastic, more people will buy the cheaper good and the incomes of mainstream producers will increase. If demand is inelastic, the same number of people will buy the good and incomes will decrease given the lower price (Hayes 2008 as an alternative to employer monopsony for independent producer households or other workers.
While this yields welfare benefits independent of the price premium, if the Fair Trade cooperative is too small to affect the monopsonistic employer, the price premium is required to obtain pro-competitive effects (Hayes 2006) . When imperfect competition is in place with a monopsonistic/oligopolistic market structure, prices may not be Pareto-optimal; instead, they may reflect the market power of exporters, importers, or intermediaries. For example, Ronchi Trade can help underprivileged market actors pay for such costs. For example, some producers may encounter search frictions in finding an importer willing to buy their products. In the presence of these market failures, the Fair Trade scheme may subsidize co-operatives' efforts to match with an importer and improve their bargaining power (Baumann et al. 2012) .
Economists have also modeled how Fair Trade schemes affect the quality of the product sold. In De Janvry et al's model (2011) , rents from Fair Trade are dissipated through quality arbitrage where conventional markets reward quality, but Fair Trade markets do so only weakly.
The best-quality product will sell on premium conventional markets, the Fair Trade price will 7 garner medium-quality coffee, and low-quality product will sell at the basic price. Alternatively, Richardson and Stahler (2007) with open access at a fixed cost, yet it does not provide a commitment to buying all output. Thus, farmers pay the cost to acquire Fair Trade certification and only enter the market as long as it is profitable to do so. As many organizations become certified, however, given limited demand, the percentage of each organization's sales to Fair Trade is reduced. Potential entrants find the cost of certification to be higher than the returns they would make from the Fair Trade premium earned on a limited percentage of their product.
Fair Trade has also been assessed regarding its potential effects on labor markets. If there is low labor demand in rural areas, then the household production possibility set may include a range of activities that yield less than the market wage, but offer more than the marginal utility of 8 leisure. The introduction of Fair Trade production increases opportunities for employment at market wages and with higher levels of productivity, thereby enabling farming households to move away from activities in the interior of their production possibilities set to a point closer to the frontier (Hayes 2006) . Wages may go up throughout a region in response to higher Fair
Trade wages , and the Fair Trade social premium's investment in health, education, and infrastructure can benefit all actors in the economy.
Finally, it has been questioned whether Fair Trade price premiums are the best way to support underprivileged small-scale producers. Leclair (2002) notes that it may be more efficient for consumers to give grants to development aid organizations that provide direct help to underprivileged producers, since the Fair Trade premium's welfare benefits may be diffused by income effects which will tend to reduce farmers' effort and the quantity of products sold, thereby reducing the amount of the premium received by the farmer. Despite this potential drawback, the same author concludes that Fair Trade may nonetheless be preferable, "primarily because it allows work, rather than passive acceptance of aid, to be a means of improving standards of living" (Leclair 2008 (Leclair : 2962 . Other analysis suggests that Fair Trade is not necessarily inefficient and that there may be general equilibrium effects; for example consumers also gain a personal benefit from the knowledge that they are giving their money directly to the person who is growing their coffee, known as the "warm glow effect" (Hayes 2008, Richardson and Stahler 2007 outcomes between these two groups, the estimates are likely to be affected by selection bias,
given that the certification decision might be driven by unobserved factors (e.g. motivation) or observed factors.
Fair Trade certification begins with producers, usually associations of small-scale farmers or firms who make the raw ingredients in Fair Trade-certified products. In the case of cooperative certification, in most cases the cooperative existed prior to seeking out Fair Trade certification, such as for the purpose of government extension or to obtain organic certification.
Depending on the particular cooperative, farmer members may each pay a portion of the costs of certification or the cooperative itself can pay them using the organizations' savings and/or other revenue sources. While the practice varies from case to case, most cooperatives have procedures in place to allow in new members, govern themselves, and provide technical assistance to their members (Raynolds et al 2004) .
The study of the determinants of selection into certification is an understudied aspect of observable (e.g. education, age, farm size) and unobservable characteristics (e.g. motivation) are the same for both groups. In the context of Fair Trade, however, the random assignment of farmers is highly unlikely in light of its institutional and political features. In the absence of a randomized assignment, a common approach used to correct for potential selection bias is propensity score matching. In this case, certified producers are paired with uncertified producers that have very similar, if not identical, observable characteristics that plausibly affect outcomes. It should be noted that propensity score matching estimates are still biased if there are important unobserved differences between the groups.
Outcomes of Interest
Most papers that focused solely on price paid to the cooperative as the dependent variable found a positive impact of Fair Trade on that outcome. However, price is a very weak indicator of producer welfare. Fair Trade certification involves associated costs and changes in productivity. Several studies defined price based on the internationally defined Fair Trade minimum price and assumed that this price was received by producers. However, the minimum price is not generally equal to the farm-gate price received by Fair Trade farmers. Cooperatives receive the minimum price, and they often take deductions, for example to compensate for export credit costs or to pay down debt incurred to obtain certification (Calo and Wise 2005) . There is evidence suggesting that the certification cost is significant for small cooperatives; Saenz-Segura Similarly, studies that define the income of producers as the outcome variable are also methodologically problematic. If revenues are defined as prices multiplied by quantity, then the concerns regarding price measurement described in previous paragraphs are relevant. Quantity can be defined through reference to cooperative records, by farmers' reported sales to the Fair Trade cooperative, by farmers' total reported sales, by farmers' reported total yields (including household consumption), or by measured yields. Each measure yields a different scale of impact.
With regards to net income, some studies do not subtract any costs before reporting revenue statistics while others do deduct such costs and report on net income. Weber (2011) defines the "net premium" from Fair Trade-organic sales as the Fair Trade-organic mandated price minus the per-unit certification cost (including certification fees and building 13 infrastructure). The author notes that this equation takes into account neither farm-level costs nor pecuniary benefits from social premium spending. Beuchelt and Zeller (2011) define economic profit as the accounting profit minus opportunity costs such as interest for machines and variable cost, opportunity cost of land, and opportunity cost of family labor, where the interest rate used is 17% as is common in the region. Calo and Wise (2005) deduce producer cost as certification cost/area plus organization costs subtracted from actual producer prices along with presumed labor cost/quintal (which is different for organic and conventional farmers) to find net income.
Valkila (2009) 
IV. Findings
IV.1 Prices
The main characteristics of the Fair Trade movement are associated with the Fair Trade premium and price floors.
iii Thus, it is not surprising that most cross-sectional studies find that One of the shortcomings of the previous literature, as mentioned before, is that most studies compare outcomes of Fair Trade certified farmers against farmers delivering to the conventional market, but these two groups are not really comparable if there is selection into Fair
Trade. For example, if selection into Fair Trade is correlated with characteristics that also cause farmers to produce better quality coffee and thus charge a higher price, the price difference may be upward biased. Thus, the previous findings are informative but should be taken with caution.
An alternative strategy is to use propensity score matching in order to reduce the bias in the estimates. For example, Fort and Ruben (2009b) given that much of the world demand for Fair Trade products requires that it be also Organic.
Moving from high-intensity management using chemical fertilizers and pesticides to Organic production could adversely affect productivity (Barham et al 2010) . The diversity of results might be driven by how productivity is defined, but all rely on simple mean comparisons without controlling for the various factors that affect farmers'
performance. Differences between Organic, Fair Trade, and conventional growers could reflect local conditions or pre-existing differences in management techniques that increase yields. Of the empirical papers that aimed at controlling for selection bias, the evidence suggests that yields may be at least as important as prices, if not more so, in changing the profits that producers make. The study by Barham et al. (2011) of 845 coffee growing households in Southern Mexico defined net income as total revenue (price times sales) minus cash costs and revealed that yield differences account for at least two-thirds of the difference in the net revenue per hectare gap between Fair Trade-Organic and conventional producers.
IV.3 Income
Another debatable issue is the income effect of Fair Trade certification. Most early studies found a clear, positive, and significant correlation (Jaffee 2009; Ronchi 2002) . However, as noted in the methodology section, these estimates may be affected by selection bias. In 18 addition, there is great variety in the measures reported as "net income" or "profit". In most cases, a gross revenue statistic is calculated using factory-or farmer-reported prices and output.
Costs are subtracted from this figure, including for example time spent on cooperative participation, per-farmer certification costs, opportunity costs at market interest rates, cash expenses, and household labor time. Most reported net income statistics refer to net income from sales of the product that is Fair Trade certified only, and most are reported at a household level, not on a per-capita basis.
Studies that control for selection bias find that the extent of predicted income gains from There is also suggestive evidence on savings and assets. Geiger-Oneto and Arnould consistently dedicate higher relative expenditure shares to long-term investment in household durables, home improvements, and education (Ruben 2009 ). Consistent with these findings, Barham et al. (2011) found that investment in schooling is more prevalent and far greater in magnitude than are investments in coffee. Investments in migration are less frequent but involve much higher commitments. Investment in coffee was quite low; the average annual investment in the coffee farm was US$47, with a range from $25 to $93 among regions, calculated as the market wage times the household labor time spent on farm improvement activities (Barham et al. 2011 and 100% of output. In one comparison of different certification types, Fair Trade certification had the lowest proportion of output sold at certified prices, at 60% of total volume sold at the higher rates (Mendez et al. 2010) . Most studies indicated that cooperatives' contracts with Fair
Trade buyers were made at least for one year, and often for longer, although in two cases, Fair
Trade prices were paid through spot markets. Interestingly, there is evidence that suggests that the timing of buyer payments to producers was important in the decision to sell to Fair Trade markets. For example, Bacon (2005) found in a study of 228 Nicaraguan farmers that cooperatives pay farmers in stages, first as credit for the harvest, second when farmers bring the wet coffee to the dry processing facility, and third when actual prices were calculated. On average, Fair Trade-certified farmers waited about one month and a half before receiving full payment, while Organic certified farmers waited more than two months. The late payment was owing to delays in receipt of payment from overseas buyers and the relatively small size of cooperatives that prevented them from having the capital on hand to advance payment to producers.
IV.5 Labor, Education and Health
Producers of less labor intensive products such as coffee are considered by the FLO as small-scale producers if farm work is mostly done by family members; thus, the absence of studies on Fair Trade's impact on coffee farm labor is not surprising. However, the FLO stipulates that plantations can hire labor and must pay them legal minimum wage. There is a 22 dearth of studies on Fair Trade's impact on labor, with the exception of a study on labor in the East African flower industry (Riisgaard 2009 ) and a study of banana workers in Ghana (Ruben and van Schendel 2009) . The latter finds that, although the salaries of Fair Trade workers are lower, they work fewer hours and obtain better fringe benefits. Despite high Fair Trade price premiums and regional labor shortages, the absence of wage premiums might be explained by socially embedded labor market rigidities (Ruben and Zuniga 2011) .
In addition to wages and employment, there might be other channels through which Fair
Trade might affect labor outcomes. Fair Trade certification implies that the cooperative is maintaining minimum working conditions, such as freedom from discrimination, freedom of labor, compliance with minimum wages laws, and prevention of employment of children below the age of 15 or the age defined by local law, whichever is higher. Given that an important fraction of children in developing countries are working in family farms (Edmonds and Pavnick 2005) , the FLO allows children under the age of 15 to work if they work after school or during holidays, the type of work is not dangerous or exploitative, and the number of work hours of supervised by their parents.
Based on a simple neoclassical model of household time allocation, the number of children engaged in farm work could decrease if household income rises due to Fair Trade certification. At the same time, however, child labor could be positively correlated with Fair
Trade certification due to an increase in the demand for family labor, as has been suggested by Kruger (2007) in her study of the child labor response to the temporary surge in coffee prices during the 1990s in Brazil. At the macro level, Baland and Duprez (2009) Organic produce can be more time consuming to pick because of low yields, and so Fair TradeOrganic may provide few benefits to hired labor (Valkila 2009 ).
In regards to health outcomes, the evidence, although minimal, suggests a positive correlation. Arnould et al. (2009) 
